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THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND COLLECTIVE
DEFENSE AT 70: CONFESSION AND RESPONSE REVISITED
Michael N. Schmitt*
On the birth of the North Atlantic Alliance seven decades ago,1
Georg Schwarzenberger, the great British legal scholar, observed:
The North Atlantic Pact is a confession and a response. It is a
confession of the constitutional inability of the United Nations to
achieve its avowed main purpose of maintaining world order. It is a
response to the insidious attempts of the Soviet Union to gain the fruits
of another major war by all measures short of open war with the
Western powers.2

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—also known as the Washington Treaty,3
which provides for the collective defense of the Alliance, was the practical
response to that confession. Yet by the turn of the 21st century, the need for
confession and response seemed to be fading away. The Soviet Union had
collapsed, the Warsaw Pact was gone, democracy was on the rise throughout
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space, and the global security environment
had become unipolar, with the United States exercising apparently benign

*
Professor of International Law, University of Exeter; Howard S. Levie Professor, U.S. Naval War
College; Francis Lieber Distinguished Scholar, US Military Academy at West Point. The author is appreciative
of the invaluable assistance of the Allied Command Transformation legal team, especially Mr. Lewis
Bumgardner, and of the NATO Legal Adviser, Mr. Steven Hill. Views expressed are solely those of the author
in his personal capacity.
1
See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 224, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. The North Atlantic Treaty
established a grouping of States known as the North Atlantic Alliance (or North Atlantic Pact). The title “North
Atlantic Treaty Organization” was coined in the North Atlantic Council Final Communiqué of September 17,
1949. Final Communiqué, Sept. 17, 1949. NATO was established two years later with adoption of the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement, and then the Paris Protocol and the Ottawa Agreement. See Agreement Between
the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199
U.N.T.S. 67; Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up Pursuant to the North Atlantic
Treaty, Aug. 28, 1952, 5 U.S.T. 870, 200 U.N.T.S. 340; Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, National Representatives and International Staff, Sept. 20, 1951, 5 U.S. T. 1087, 200 U.N.T.S 3.
2
Georg Schwarzenberger, The North Atlantic Pact, 2 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 309, 309
(1949). On announcing the text of the proposed North Atlantic Treaty in March 1949, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson noted with reference to the United Nations, “The system is not working as effectively as we hoped
because one of its members has attempted to prevent it from working. By obstructive tactics and the misuse of
the veto, the Soviet Union has seriously interfered with the work of the Security Council in maintaining
international peace and security.” Dean Acheson, Broadcast on Atlantic Accord, Radio Address to the Nation
(March 18, 1949), in N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1949, http://movies2.nytimes.com/library/world/global/
031949nato-acheson-text.html [hereinafter Acheson Address].
3
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
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supremacy.4 In light of these tectonic shifts, it appeared that the United Nations
was on the verge of finally having assumed its intended collective security—as
distinct from collective defense—role, as it had been in the process of doing for
a number of years, most notably in the Balkans.5 In the eyes of many, there was
no longer an existential threat against which the West was forced to organize in
preparation for aggression. Although the Alliance continued to espouse its core
mission of collective defense, the organization realized it had to transform.6
Some questioned the need for NATO at all.7
Predictions of an “end of history” and expectations of an impending “peace
dividend” proved premature.8 New threats emerged on the security horizon,
especially transnational terrorism. Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5
collective defense provision would for the first time in its history be invoked not
in response to an attack by Warsaw Pact forces, but rather one mounted by a
transnational terrorist group operating from within Alliance territory and
employing rudimentary weapons, such as box cutters.9 In the aftermath of the
tragic events of September 11, 2001, NATO would play a central role in the

4
See generally, A Short History of NATO, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm?selectedLocale=en.
5
“Collective defense” refers to the right of one or more States to come to the assistance of a State (or
States) that is the object of an armed attack pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international
law. See U.N. Charter art. 51. “Collective security,” in contrast, refers to a mechanism by which security in
general is maintained. In the U.N. Charter context, the collective security arrangement is set forth in Chapter
VII, which allows the Security Council to authorize or mandate action pursuant to Article 42, including the use
of force, once the Security Council has identified a situation as a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression” in accordance with Article 39. Id. at ch. VII, art. 39, 42 An armed attack would qualify as such,
but Article 39 is not limited to its occurrence. Rather, the Security Council action may either be designed to
“restore international peace and security” in the event of a breach of the peace or of aggression or maintain it in
the face of a threat to the peace. Id. at arts. 39–42, 51. An organization may have both purposes, as is the case
with the Organization of American States. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), art. 5,
Sept. 2, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Treaty]; Charter of the Organization of
American States, arts. 28–29, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
6
London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, NATO: ON-LINE LIBRARY (Oct. 27,
2000), https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm.
7
See, e.g., John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, 15(1) INT’L
SECURITY 5, 52 (1990); Statement of Kenneth N. Waltz, Conditions for Security in a Multipolar World in
RELATIONS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 101ST
CONG., 2ND SESS. (1991).
8
FRANCIS FUKIYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992); Ann Masrkusen, How We Lost
the Peace Dividend, 33 AM. PROSPECT 86 (1997).
9
See A SHORT HISTORY OF NATO supra note 4.
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effort to secure peace and maintain international security, even beyond the
organization’s borders.10
Today, NATO is at another inflection point in its history. Still the preeminent
military alliance in the world, it faces unprecedented external and internal
threats. Externally, a revanchist Russia is in belligerent occupation of territory
on NATO’s border in Ukraine, a country that has had a special relationship with
the Alliance since 1991, when Ukraine joined the Atlantic Cooperation
Council.11 In light of the ongoing international armed conflict between Russia
and Ukraine, the Baltic nations that border Russia rightly worry that, given their
size and significant ethnic Russian populations, they could be next.12 In light of
the Russian veto on the Security Council, this menace cannot be left to the
United Nations to handle.
The threats to the Alliance’s members (“Allies”) today are not limited to
classic attack by the armed forces of another State—or States. As noted by the
NATO Heads of State and Government in their 2018 Brussels Summit
Declaration, stability and security is also endangered by hostile cyber
operations; “crises across the Middle East and Africa [that] are fueling
terrorism” and “contribute to irregular migration and human trafficking;” the
crisis in Syria which “has a direct effect on the stability of the region and the
security of the Alliance as a whole;” “hybrid challenges, including
disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber activities;” and “proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and advanced missile technology.”13 In 2016, at the
Warsaw Summit, NATO leaders had also noted that the “trafficking of arms,
drugs, and human being across the Sahel-Sahara region continue to threaten
regional and our own security” and highlighted the continuing threat posed by
piracy.14
Nevertheless, collective defense pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty remains the foundational and motivational purpose of the Alliance. This
was confirmed by NATO member States during the Brussels Summit, which
observed that “[t]he greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and
10

Id.
Relations with Ukraine, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jul. 1, 2009), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_37750.htm?selectedLocale=en#.
12
See, e.g. Estonia’s Defense Minister Juri Luik on Russian Threats and Defending the Baltics, DEFENSE
NEWS (Sept. 17, 2018) (discussing this worry), https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2018/09/17/estoniasdefense-minister-on-russian-threats-and-defending-the-baltics/.
13
Id.
14
Warsaw Summit Communiqué, July 9, 2016, ¶¶ 31, 90 [hereinafter Warsaw Summit Communiqué].
11
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defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of
any of its members were to be threatened.”15
This article, together with the others in this special issue of the Emory
International Law Review, celebrates the 70th anniversary of the Alliance.
Survival of the world’s most effective military alliance over seven decades is
best explained by the shared and continuing commitment of the Allies to the
collective defense of the Euro–Atlantic States that is provided for in Article 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty.16 The focus here is on that single provision, without
which there would be no Alliance. It begins with a review of the genesis and
history of the Article 5 commitment. The foundation laid, the wording of the
provision is normatively deconstructed. In particular, this contribution raises and
comments upon issues in the application of Article 5 with regard to which a
degree of uncertainty remains. Finally, thoughts as to the significance of
collective defense within the Alliance are offered.
I.

THE GENESIS OF ARTICLE 5

It is sometimes forgotten that the prohibition on the use of force is of
relatively recent vintage in modern international law.17 Only in the mid-20th
century did it emerge fully formed. Along with that prohibition, a corresponding
sine qua non exception for situations necessitating self-defense was also
codified.18
Some tentative progress was made towards a use of force prohibition in the
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions (I), Article 2 Common of which provided
for reference to good offices or mediation in the event of an “appeal to arms.”19
Parallel progress was made in Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention (II),
which banned the use of force, except in certain specified circumstances, for the

15
Press Release, NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, ¶ 33 (JULY 11, 2018) [hereinafter Brussels
Summit].
16
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
17
See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, chs. 3–4 (6th ed. 2017); see Roberto
Ago, ILC Special Rapporteur, Addendum: Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.
5-7, II(1), reprinted in 1980 ILC Y.B. 13, 51–52.
18
See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 17.
19
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. 2, 36 Stat. 2199 (1907);
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. 2, 32 Stat. 1779, 1 Bevans 230
(1899).
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purpose of recovering contractual debts owed to a State’s nationals.20 However,
it was not until the adoption of the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations that
a broad prohibition appeared. Article 10 of that instrument required League
members to “respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial
integrity and existing political independence of Members of the League.”21
Yet this prohibition was far from absolute. For instance, should a
circumstance arise that was likely to lead to a resort to arms, member States were
obligated to submit the matter to arbitration, judicial settlement, or an inquiry by
the Council of the League.22 For three months following consideration of the
matter, they were prohibited from going to war.23 Other provisions further
narrowed the prohibition’s scope.24 Perhaps most importantly, the Covenant
applied only between members, except when a non-member accepted the
obligations set forth therein with respect to the settlement of a particular
dispute.25
During the interwar years, a number of attempts to extend these limited
prohibitions were made; none bore fruit.26 Most significant was the 1928
Kellogg–Briand Pact, which encompassed sixty-three States by the outbreak of
World War II. Article 1 of the three-article treaty provided that the Parties
“condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce[ed] it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another.”27 By Article 2, they agreed that disputes “shall never be sought except

20
Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract
Debts, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607 (1907).
21
League of Nations Covenant, art. 10.
22
Id. at arts. 13, 17.
23
Id. at art. 12.
24
Id. at arts. 13, 15.
25
Id. at art. 17.
26
See, e.g., Geneva Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. 22, 2 INT. LEG. 1378,
1379 (1924). The Geneva Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was adopted by the
Assembly of the League of Nations in 1924 but never entered into force. Id.
27
General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (“Kellogg-Briand Pact”),
art. 1, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1928) [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; See 33 AM. J. INT’L L. Sp. Supp., 865 (1939)
(for a list of the States that ratified or adhered to the Pact by the end of 1938.).
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by pacific means.”28 Like the Covenant, the Pact applied only between States
Party.29
Prior to the 20th century, assertions that actions were being taken for
defensive reasons were primarily political in character.30 But if the resort to force
was generally to be prohibited by international law, it would be necessary to
allow States to employ force defensively, including collectively, in certain
circumstances. Thus, for example, Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations provided, “should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard
of its covenants…it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war
against all other Members of the League.”31 Hans Morgenthau labeled the article
“the pioneering attempt at putting a system of collective security into effect.”32
Similarly, by the 1925 Locarno Pact, Belgium and Germany, and France and
Germany, agreed to refrain from going to war against each other; Great Britain
and Italy served as guarantors.33 However, the pledge was subject to a number
of exceptions. These included “the right of legitimate defence” in the face of a
violation of the pledge or of specified conditions set forth in the 1919 Treaty of
Versailles that ended World War I, collective action as provided for in Article
16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and, in the event of failure to
implement collective action, such action as is “necessary for the maintenance of
right and justice.”34
Although the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact had failed to expressly provide for
a right of self-defense, a number of Parties thereto asserted that right in
reservations.35 Moreover, pursuant to the Pact’s Preamble, a Party that resorted
to war was denied the benefits of the treaty, that is, the right to be free from acts
of war directed against it.36 Effectively, this meant that a State was not bound by

28

Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 27, art. 2.
Id.
30
Georg Nolte & Albrecht Randelzhofer, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 51, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1397,
1399 (Bruno Simma et. al. eds., 2012).
31
League of Nations Covenant, supra note 21, art. 16.
32
HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 232 (1949).
33
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, art. 1, Oct. 16, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 289.
34
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol.
T.S. 188; Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, supra note 28, art. 2; Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, supra note 35, art. 2;
League of Nations Covenant supra note 21, art. 15.
35
See Identical Notes of the United States to other Governments in Relation to the Pact, reprinted in 22
AM. J. INT’L L., Supp., 109–13 (1928); replies at 23 AM. J. INT’L L., Supp., 1–13 (1929).
36
Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 27, pmbl. (“… any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to
29
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the prohibition so long as it was employing force defensively against another
Party. It would not be until adoption of the Charter of the United Nations in
1945, however, that the right of self-defense as we know it today was codified
in a multi-national instrument.37
In light of the tragic conflagration that ravaged the international community
during World War II, the drafters of the U.N. Charter were intent on ruling out
the resort to force. The result was Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”38
The Charter provided for two exceptions to this prohibition. The first
allowed for uses of force authorized or mandated by the Security Council
pursuant to Chapter VII of the instrument in order to “maintain or restore
international peace or security.”39 Such collective security action had to be based
on a finding by the Council that a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression” exists.40 Today, there is no question that NATO may act,
including through the use of force, pursuant to a Security Council Chapter VII
resolution, as it has done on numerous occasions without meaningful objection
from the international community.41
However, States were understandably uneasy about relying entirely on a
collective security mechanism for, after all, the League of Nations had failed
promote its national interests by resort to war a should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty.”).
37
See U.N. Charter supra note 5.
38
Id. art. 2(4).
39
Id. art. 39. Pursuant to Article 53(1) of the Charter, the Security Council may authorize “regional
arrangements or agencies” to take enforcement action under Chapter VII. Id. art. 53(1). NATO does not consider
itself such an entity. See, e.g. NATO Secretary General, Minute Interpreting the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO
Doc. PO/55/431 April 12, 1955, Annex A, Excerpt from Minutes of the 18th Meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks on Security, ¶ 7, March 15, 1949 (on file with author); Statement of Deputy Assistant
Secretary-General for Political Affairs of NATO, Mr. Robert F. Simmons, U.N.S.C. 5007th meeting (20 July
2004), S/PV.5007. By contrast, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, formerly the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is, for instance, a regional arrangement. Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe: Declarations and Decisions from Helsinki Summit, 10 July 1992, 31 I.L.M.
1392, 1400 (1992). Other regional arrangements as envisioned under Article 53 include the OAS and
Commonwealth of Independent States. See Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 5; Charter
of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Jan. 22, 1993.
40
U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 39.
41
See id. at ch. VII. In 1992, the NAC expressed “the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a caseby-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the
U.N. Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security.” Final
Communiqué, Dec. 17, 1992. Since then, it has participated in numerous operations under this authority, most
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miserably. Therefore, the U.N. Charter expressly set forth, at the insistence of
the United States, a right to self-defense in Article 51.42
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.43

Following adoption of the Charter in 1945, the alliance that had been formed to
fight the Axis powers quickly unraveled. Indeed, less than a year later, former
Prime Minister Winston Churchill would warn, in his “Sinews of Peace” speech,
that:
there is nothing [the Russians] admire so much as strength, and there
is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness,
especially military weakness… If the Western Democracies stand
together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations
Charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be immense
and no one is likely to molest them.44

His warning was prophetic. In late 1946, Greece alleged before the U.N. Security
Council that neighboring States were interfering in its internal affairs by
providing arms and equipment to insurgents.45 A commission tasked by the
Council with investigating the situation concluded that support by Albania,
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia qualified as a “threat to the peace.”46 Meanwhile, the
Soviet Union made claims to parts of eastern Turkey and sought a degree of

notably in the International Security Assistance Mission in Afghanistan that was originally established pursuant
to U.N. S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001). From 2003, it led the operation. ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan (2001–
2014), NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_
69366.htm.
42
LORD ISMAY, NATO: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 1949–1954 12 (1954).
43
U.N. Charter supra note 5, art. 51.
44
Winston S. Churchill, Address at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri: The Sinews of Peace (Mar.
5, 1946) in The Sinews of Peace, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Mar. 5, 1946), https://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/news_16942.htm?selectedLocale=en.
45
Arthur L. Goodhart, The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, in 79 RECUIEL DES COURS 183, 211–12 (1951).
46
Id.
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control over the Dardanelles.47 By early 1948, the Communist Party had gained
or seized power throughout Eastern Europe—the Soviet “sphere of influence”—
despite the 1945 Declaration of Liberated Europe issued by Roosevelt, Churchill
and Stalin at the Yalta Conference, according to which the three committed
themselves to free elections.48
To address such situations of international instability, the U.N. Charter had
called for the establishment of a United Nations armed force pursuant to Articles
43 through 48. But discussions in the U.N. Military Staff regarding that force
led nowhere.49 In its absence, and given the growing tension between East and
West, the right of self-defense took on new meaning.
President Truman, in response to tension with the Soviet Union, set forth the
so-called Truman Doctrine in a March 1947 speech to Congress.50 The Truman
Doctrine provided for the delivery of aid to both Greece and Turkey on the basis
that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”51
Truman’s address marked the commencement of the Cold War. That June, U.S.
Secretary of State George Marshall announced aid to Europe that would become
known as the Marshall Plan.52 Sixteen European States, as well as the French,
British, and American zones of occupation in Germany, took advantage of the
Plan; the Communist States did not.53
Europe was now divided intractably between two competing blocs. As a
result, the United States adopted a policy of “containment,” so-named because
it was designed to contain the “expansive tendencies” of the Soviet Union.54 The
47

Id.
Yalta Conference Agreement, Declaration of a Liberated Europe, Feb. 11, 1945.
49
See U.N. Charter supra note 5, arts. 43–48.
50
Harry S. Truman, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress (March 12, 1947), in Truman
Doctrine,YALE AVALON PROJECT (1947), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp.
51
Id.
52
George C. Marshall, The Marshall Plan Speech, Harvard University (June 5, 1947), in The Marshall
Plan Speech, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (1947), https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1947/s470605a_e.htm.
53
To implement the Marshall Plan, the States receiving aid and the Commanders of the French, U.S. and
U.K. occupation zones established the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation on April 16, 1948. See
Organisation
for
European
Economic
Co-operation,
OECD,
https://www.oecd.org/general/
organisationforeuropeaneconomicco-operation.htm.
54
The term “containment” and the reference to “expansive tendencies” are drawn from the famous “X
Article,” which appeared in the journal Foreign Affairs. Drawn from the February 1946 “Long Telegram” by
the Moscow Deputy Chief of Mission, George Kennan, the X Article was originally a report written for Secretary
of Defense James Forrestal in January 1947. Kennan published it under the pseudonym “X” in July 1946. See
X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566, 575 (July 1947); Telegram, George Kennan to George
48
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confrontation between East and West would soon play out militarily with the
Soviet blockade of Berlin between June 1948 and May 1949.55 The specter of
U.S. and Soviet forces facing each other across Checkpoint Charlie brought the
use of force and self-defense provisions that had been set forth in the Charter
into stark relief.
The immediate postwar period was also characterized by the establishment
of a number of treaty-based defensive arrangements. In 1947 the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was adopted in Rio de Janeiro.56 Article 3 of the
Rio Treaty provided that:
an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be
considered as an attack against all the American States, and
consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to
assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations.57

A careful parsing of the text confirms that Article 3’s collective defense
arrangement applied not only to armed attacks by non-Party States, but also to
those that might be launched by one of the Parties to the instrument against
another.
In Europe, the United Kingdom and France agreed to come to each other’s
assistance against any future German aggression in the 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk,
which referred in its preamble to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.58 The following
year the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries adopted the
Brussels Treaty, described in its preamble as, inter alia, a treaty for “collective
defense.”59 Article IV provided, “If any of the High Contracting Parties should
be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties
will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance

Marshall, Feb. 22, 1946, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/
6-6.pdf [hereinafter Long Telegram].
55
The Berlin Blockade, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
declassified_136188.htm?selectedLocale=en.
56
Rio Treaty, supra note 5.
57
Id. art. 3.
58
Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and France, pmbl. & art. II,
Mar. 4, 1947, 9 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Treaty of Dunkirk].
59
See The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Mar. 17,
1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter Brussels Treaty].
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in their power.”60 The agreement demonstrated the extent to which the West was
eyeing the Soviet Union and its Eastern Europe satellites as possible authors of
an armed attack meriting application of the self and collective defense provisions
of the U.N. Charter.61 Belgian Prime Minister, and future NATO Secretary
General, Henri Spaak confirmed this concern in his September 1948 “Speech of
Fear” to the U.N. General Assembly:
La délégation soviétique ne doit pas chercher d’explications
compliquées à notre politique.
…
Savez-vous quelle est la base de notre politique ? C’est la peur. La peur
de vous, la peur de votre Gouvernement, la peur de votre politique.
…
Savez-vous pourquoi nous avons peur? Nous avons peur parce que
vous parlez souvent d’impérialisme. Quelle est la définition de
l’impérialisme? Quelle est la notion courante de l’impérialisme? C’est
celle d’un peuple - généralement d’un grand pays - qui fait des
conquêtes et qui augmente, à travers le monde, son influence.62

On the heels of the Brussels Treaty’s adoption, the United States, United
Kingdom, Canada, and the Benelux countries began secret talks designed to
enhance collective defense.63 Following the introduction by Senator Arthur
Vandenberg of a Senate Resolution authorizing the development of collective
defense arrangements—without committing the United States to engage in
defensive measures except in accordance with US constitutional processes—
open negotiations with European States commenced. 64 In April 1949, the North
Atlantic Treaty was signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.65 By the preamble to the instrument, the Parties resolved
“to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and

60

Id. art. 4.
In 1954 the treaty was amended to create the Western European Union. Protocol Modifying Treaty for
Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-Defence, Oct. 23, 1954, 211
U.N.T.S. 342; Protocol on Forces of Western European Union, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 358.
62
Paul-Henri Spaak, Speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Washington (Sept. 28, 1948).
63
These were known as the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security. The Records of the talks, since
declassified, are available on the website of the Department of State’s Office of the Historian,
https://history.state.gov/. The French were intentionally excluded. Alex Danchev, Taking the Pledge: Oliver
Franks and the Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, 15(2) DIPLOMATIC HIST. 199, 201 (1991). See generally
Cees Wiebes & Bert Zeeman, The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948: The Launching of the North Atlantic
Treaty, 59(3) INT’L AFF. 351 (1983) (discussing the negotiations).
64
S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1948).
65
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1.
61
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security.”66 The North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate in July
and came into force on August 24, 1949.67
Moscow was not amused. The Soviet Union claimed that the treaty
“contradicts the principles and aims of the United Nations organisation and the
commitments which the Governments of the United States of America, Great
Britain and France have assumed under other treaties and agreements.”68 It
further pointed out that “[o]f the great powers only the Soviet Union is excluded
from among the parties to this treaty,” alleging that this “can be explained only
by the fact that this treaty is directed against the Soviet Union.”69
In response Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, declared that the treaty was
purely defensive in nature.70 According to Acheson, “[t]his country is not
planning to make war against anyone … allegations that aggressive designs lie
behind this country’s signature of the Atlantic [P]act can rest only on a malicious
misrepresentation or a fantastic misunderstanding of the nature and aims of
American Society.”71 Indeed, the operative fulcrum upon which agreement
rested was Article 5, a collective defense provision.72 Article 5 states that:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them
all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs,
each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective selfdefense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.73
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall
66

Id. at pmbl.
Richard H. Heindel, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, & Francis O. Wilcox, The North Atlantic Treat in the United
States Senate, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 633, 649–51 (1949).
68
Text of the Soviet Memorandum on the Atlantic Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1949, http://movies2.nytimes.
com/library/world/global/040149nato-soviet-text.html.
69
Id.
70
Acheson Address, supra note 2.
71
Id.; See Vojtech Mastny, NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949–56,
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Working Paper No. 35 2002) (on the Soviet Union’s view
of NATO’s establishment).
72
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
73
Id. During consideration of the treaty, the Senate treated the article as the instrument’s most significant
provision. Heindel, supra note 67, at 645.
67
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be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.74

Importantly, the drafters followed the Rio Pact’s collective defense format
rather than that of the Brussels Treaty.75 As with the former, Article 5 did not
unconditionally commit Parties to come to the defense of another Party.76 This
represented a victory in the negotiations for North Americans who were hesitant
to agree in advance to participate in another European conflict.77 Instead, parties
to the North Atlantic Treaty only committed themselves to those measures in
collective defense that they deemed necessary in the attendant circumstances.78
As Acheson explained, “this does not mean that the United States would be
automatically at war if one of the nations covered by the pact is subject to armed
attack. Under our Constitution the Congress alone has the power to declare
war.”79 Nevertheless, lest the wrong conclusion be drawn, the Secretary
accentuated the US pledge to act in collective defense:
It is a simple fact, proved by experience, that an outside attack on one
member of this community is an attack upon all members. We have
also learned that if free nations do not stand together, they will fall one
by one…. We and the free nations of Europe are determined that
history shall not repeat itself in that melancholy particular.80

By 2019, Article 5 bound twenty-nine nations as member States of the North
Atlantic Alliance.81
A. The North Atlantic Treaty Deconstructed
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has only approved collective defense of
an Ally once. On September 12, 2001, the Alliance invoked Article 5 in response
to the Al Qaeda attacks against the United States the previous day.82 The
74

North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
See Id.; Rio Treaty, supra note 5; Brussels Treaty, supra note 59.
76
Schwarzenberger, supra note 2, at 313–14.
77
See Sylvain Fournier & Sherrod Lewis Bumgardner, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: The
Cornerstone of the Alliance, 34 NATO LEGAL GAZETTE 10–11 (2014).
78
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
79
Acheson Address, supra note 2.
80
Id.
81
See Montenegro Joins NATO as 29th Ally, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jun. 5, 2017),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_144647.htm?selectedLocale=en.
82
See Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept.
12, 2001). Similarly, the Organization of American States invoked the collective self-defense provisions of the
Rio Treaty following its finding that “these terrorist attacks against the United States are attacks against all
American States.” Terrorist Threat to the Americas, OEA/Ser.F/II.24, RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sep. 21, 2001).
75
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invocation was conditioned on the premise that the attacks had been directed
from outside the United States, a fact confirmed on October 2, 2001.83 On
October 4, the Allies agreed on a package of eight measures requested by the
United States, to be taken individually and collectively.84 They ranged from
enhanced intelligence sharing to the deployment of a NATO Airborne Warning
and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to monitor U.S. airspace in Operation
Eagle Assist.85 Later that month, NATO launched Operation Active Endeavor,
a maritime counter-terrorism operation in the Eastern Mediterranean that was
also based on the invocation of Article 5 by the NAC.86 Active Endeavor
continued until November 2016, when Operation Sea Guardian, a non-Article 5
maritime security operation, replaced it.87
Similarly, NATO has taken “enhanced collective defense” measures
pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty when threatening situations
arise. These are designed to deter aggression and facilitate the exercise of
collective defense under Article 5 should it become necessary.88 For instance,
NATO deployed Patriot missiles to Turkey in 1991 during the first Gulf War, as
well as in 2012 to provide counter-missile capabilities in light of the Syrian
conflict.89 In 2003, it also conducted Operation Display Deterrence in Turkey as
the situation in Iraq heated up.90 NATO is presently engaged in an air policing
“Australia did likewise, citing Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty in offering to deploy military forces.” Press
Conference, Prime Minister John Howard, Government Invokes ANZUS Treaty (Sep. 14, 2001), https://
australianpolitics.com/2001/09/14/howard-government-invokes-anzus-treaty.html. [hereinafter Government
Invokes ANZUS]. Article VI of the ANZUS Treaty provides: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the
Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act
to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Security Treaty (Aust., N.Z., U.S.),
art. IV, Sep. 1, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3422, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, 84.
83
Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed, NATO UPDATE (Oct. 2, 2001), https://www.nato.int/docu/update/
2001/1001/e1002a.htm#FN1; see Fournier & Bumgardner, supra note 77, at 18 (for a view inside NATO’s
assessment and decision).
84
NATO, Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic
Council Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks
against the United States, Oct. 4, 2001, in Statement to the Press, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Oct. 4,2001),
https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm.
85
Id.
86
Operation Active Endeavour, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm.
87
Warsaw Summit Communiqué, supra note 14, ¶ 91.
88
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4 (“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion
of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”).
89
See Collective Defence–Article 5, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jun. 12, 2018), https://www.nato.
int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_110496.htm?selectedLocale=en.
90
The operation consisted of the deployment of AWACS aircraft, missile defenses, and chemical and
biological defense equipment. See Press Release, NATO, Conclusion of Operation Display Deterrence and
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mission over the Baltic Sea to deter Russian aggression and has deployed
multinational battle groups to establish an “enhanced forward presence” in
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.91 At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO
also identified cyberspace as an operational domain.92 Presently, it is moving to
enhance its capability to defend against cyber-attacks, by establishing a
Cyberspace Operations Centre.93
Despite only being invoked once, self-defense has always lain at the heart of
the Alliance’s strategic vision. The first strategy document approved by the NAC
was the December 1949 “Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic
Area.”94 In setting forth the “general principles [that] are recognized as
underlying the North Atlantic Treaty defensive organisation,” it observed, “[t]he
main principle is common action in defense against armed attack through selfhelp and mutual aid.95 The immediate objective is the achievement of
arrangements for collective self-defense among the Atlantic Treaty nations.”96
Four decades later, the 1991 Strategic Concept reiterated that “[t]he Alliance is
purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in
self-defence.”97
The most recent strategic concept, “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,”
which was issued at the Lisbon Summit, likewise notes the centrality of Article
5.98 Although the 2010 document cites crisis management and cooperative
security as NATO core tasks, it stresses that “[t]he greatest responsibility of the
Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack,
as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”99 In this regard, the concept
treats collective defense broadly to include defending against chemical,
Article 4 Security Consultations, Apr. 16, 2003.
91
See NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Feb. 2019), https://www.
nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/20190213_1902-factsheet_efp_en.pdf; NATO Air Policing,
NATO ALLIED AIR COMMAND, https://ac.nato.int/page5931922/-nato-air-policing.
92
Warsaw Summit Communiqué, supra note 14, ¶ 70.
93
Cyber Defense, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_78170.htm.
94
THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, NATO, Enclosure (D/C
6/1), ¶ 5 & 5(a), (1949).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Nov. 8, 1991) ¶ 35,
[hereinafter New Strategic Concept], https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.
98
Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO SUMMIT (Nov. 19–20, 2010), https://www.nato.int/strategicconcept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf.
99
Id. ¶ 5.
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biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, cyber-attacks and terrorism.100
Leaders of the Alliance again echoed the keystone role of collective defense at
the 2018 Brussels Summit, emphasizing its applicability to situations involving
hybrid warfare.101
1. The Notion of “Collective Defence”
As a matter of international law, collective defense is an exceptional
measure. It is a circumstance that “precludes the wrongfulness” of a use of force
by a State acting defensively, as well as any States coming to its defense.102 In
other words, it renders lawful what would otherwise be a violation of a the most
fundamental prohibition of international law. Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty is a manifestation of this ground for the preclusion of wrongfulness visà-vis both the use of force against another State and non-compliance with other
international law prohibitions and obligations, such as the obligation to respect
the sovereignty of other States.103
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered the right of collective
self-defense in the 1986 Nicaragua case.104 Pointing to the term “inherent right”
in the text of Article 51, as well as General Assembly resolutions like the
Resolution on Friendly Relations, the Court found the right to be customary in
nature.105 Although Judge Oda questioned the finding in his Dissenting Opinion,
there is, as Yoram Dinstein has opined, “hardly any doubt that it constitutes an
integral part of customary international law as it stands today.” 106 Indeed, it has
been invoked on many occasions, some merited, others a subterfuge for
intervention. For instance, collective self-defense was the justification for: (1)
U.S. action in Lebanon in 1958; (2) US action in Vietnam between 1961 and
1975; (3) Soviet involvement in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan in 1968 in
1979 respectively; (4) support by the United States and its partners of Kuwait
100

Id. ¶ 19.
Brussels Summit, supra note 15, ¶ 1, 21.
102
G.A. Res. 56/83 annex, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 21(Dec. 12,
2001). The Articles on State Responsibility are an authoritative restatement of customary international law on
State responsibility prepared the International Law Commission. See id.
103
See Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
104
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, ¶ 193 (June 27).
105
Id.; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).
106
Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 93–95 (Oda J., dissenting) (Judge Oda questioned whether the
Court had sufficiently inquired into the pre-Charter existence of self-defense and raising doubt as to its
customary status.); U.N. Charter supra note 5, art. 51; DINSTEIN, supra note 17, ¶ 799.
101
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following Iraq’s 1990 invasion; and (5) coalition support of US Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014.107
Collective defense may be exercised in a number of ways. It encompasses
coming to the assistance of a State that is engaged in self-defense, even to the
point of providing the entire defense of that State. Defensive aid may be
provided: (1) by a single State; (2) multiple individual States operating
separately in support of the victim State; (3) an ad hoc coalition of States
operating collaboratively; or (4) a standing multinational military organization,
such as NATO. Provision of collective defense by a standing multinational
organization offers a number of key benefits. They include the advance training
of military forces from member States that may be called upon to operate
together, development of joint doctrine, establishment of command-and-control
relationships, cooperation in the building of national force structure and the
acquisition of equipment, the sharing of military facilities, and joint and
combined planning in anticipation of an armed attack. The establishment of
NATO and the vesting of it with collective defense responsibilities under Article
5 makes possible realization of these benefits.

2. Armed Attack
The determinative condition precedent to the exercise of either self or
collective defense is the occurrence of an “armed attack.”108 Obviously, the
meaning of the term as used in Article 5 cannot be broader than that which
applies to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.109 The question is whether it enjoys a
narrower meaning. It would appear not, for the references in the 2010 Strategic
Concept and the Brussels Summit Declaration to terrorism, cyber-attacks, and
hybrid warfare confirm that Article 51 is understood as extending to all armed
attacks, however launched, employing whatever means and of whatever scale.110
The dilemma is that no conclusive definition of the term “armed attack,” as
used in Article 51 or customary law, exists in international law.111 Nevertheless,
in its Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ noted that there “appears now to be general
107
See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 176 (4th ed. 2018). Operation
Enduring Freedom has been replaced by Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Id.
108
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
109
See id.; U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 51.
110
See Brussels Summit, supra note 15.
111
G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974), Although some point to the Definition of Aggression
Resolution the plain text of the instrument confirms that it was not meant to serve this purpose. See, e.g. id. ¶¶ 2,
4 pmbl., art. 6.
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agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed
attacks.”112 Despite the Court’s failure to offer guidance as to the content of that
agreement, there is broad consensus that an attack resulting in significant
physical damage or injury would so qualify.113
Beyond that consensus lie two quandaries. The first deals with the requisite
gravity of the underlying use of force against which the defensive action is taken.
In Nicaragua, the Court distinguished between “the most grave forms of the use
of force (those constituting an armed attack) [and] other less grave forms.”114
The only example provided to illustrate the difference was that of a “mere
frontier incident,” which would qualify as a use of force but not an armed
attack.115 This example provoked controversy, and rightfully so since most
States would be unlikely to conclude they are prohibited from responding with
force to a penetration of their border by another State’s armed forces.116 Further,
the Court seemed to signal that the gap between a simple use of force and an
armed attack was relatively narrow when, in its 2003 Oil Platforms judgment, it
was unwilling to exclude the possibility that using naval mines against a single
warship would qualify as the latter.117
It is accordingly problematic to identify a precise threshold of severity at
which the NAC could lawfully invoke Article 5. Further complicating matters is
the fact that the United States has long taken the position that no distinction is
to be made between the threshold for violation of the use of force prohibition
and that applying to the right of self-defense against an armed attack. In its view,
every use of force is equally an armed attack, although no other Ally has
expressly adopted this position.118 As a result, it is uncertain how the NAC

112

Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195.
See, e.g. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, r.
71 and accompanying commentary (Michael N. Schmitt ed. 2017) (supporting this proposition) [hereinafter
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
114
Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 191.
115
Id. ¶ 195.
116
DINSTEIN, supra note 17, ¶¶ 550–53.
117
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶ 72 (Nov. 6).
118
See, e.g. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, ¶ 16.3.3.1 (Dec.
2016); see also Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), in 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2012); William
H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 299–302 (2004); Abraham
D. Sofaer, International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 93–96 (1989).
The three authors served as the U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser.
113
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would respond to a U.S. request to invoke Article 5—or to one by another Ally—
in a situation involving a relatively low-level use of force.
This situation might well arise with respect to the second quandary related
to the notion of armed attack, the treatment of hostile cyber operations against a
member of the Alliance. NATO has adopted the stance that should cyber
operations qualify as an armed attack; the victim State would be entitled to
request invocation of Article 5 by the NAC.119 This position is in accord with
the generally accepted view that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter applies in the
cyber context.120
The challenge lies in identifying those cyber operations that would so
qualify. General consensus exists that a cyber operation causing significant
injurious or physically destructive consequences would amount to an armed
attack.121 The unanswered question is whether one having severe albeit neither
injurious nor physically destructive effects could ever constitute an armed attack
and, if so, under what circumstances.122 For instance, may a State treat a cyber
operation that causes widespread and severe disruption to its economic system
as an armed attack? Or do hostile cyber operations that seriously interfere with
the functioning of critical cyber infrastructure qualify as such if the interference
has not caused injury or physical damage?
States have been extremely hesitant to express opinio juris on the matter.
Among the Allies, Dutch Minister of Defence Ank Bijleveld has offered the
most direct comment. Speaking at an event to mark the first anniversary of the
publication of the Tallinn Manual 2.0, the Minister cited cyber operations
causing “serious disruption with long-lasting consequences.”123 She explained,
119
Press Release, Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating
in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, ¶ 72, Sept. 5, 2014. See also Jens Stoltenberg, NATO
Secretary General, Cyber Defence Pledge Conference, Ecole Militaire, Paris, (May 15, 2018), in Speech by
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Pledge conference (Ecole militaire, Paris), NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORG. (2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_154462.htm.
120
See, e.g. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Dev. In the Field of Info. and Telecomm. in
the Context of Intl Security, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015). Interestingly, Russia and China, inter
alia, refused to include mention the right of self-defense in an aborted report of the 6th U.N. Group of
Governmental Experts in 2017. See Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The
U.N. GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber Norms, JUST SECURITY (June 30, 2017).
121
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 113, r. 71, ¶ 8.
122
Id. r. 71, ¶¶ 9–12.
123
Ank Bijleveld, Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, We Have to Steer the Cyber
Domain before it Steers Us (June 21, 2018), in We Have to Steer the Cyber Domain before it Steers Us,
https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/cyber-security/downloads/toespraken/2018/06/20/toespraak-ministerbijleveld-op-het-symposium-tallinn-manual-2.0.
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“for instance, if a cyber-attack targets the entire Dutch financials system…or if
it prevents the government from carrying out essential tasks such as policing or
taxation…it would qualify as an armed attack…and…trigger a [S]tate’s right to
defend itself even by force.”124
As reflected in the Minister’s comments, States are likely to focus on the
severity of the consequences generated by the hostile cyber operation, rather
than their nature—e.g., destructive or nondestructive—or the mechanism
causing them—kinetic or cyber—when considering whether to characterize
them as an armed attack. But until States start publicly to add texture to the
discussion, the NAC will inevitably have to employ a “know it when I see it”
approach to invoking Article 5 in cases of cyber incidents lacking injurious or
destructive effect.
Further, a question that has animated discourse as to the scope of the right
of self-defense is whether a hostile operation launched by non-State actors from
abroad—domestic terrorism is not encompassed in the international law right of
self-defense—can ever qualify as an “armed attack,” such that the victim State
may respond at the use of force level on the basis of the law of self-defense.
There is no question, as observed in the Nicaragua judgment, that “‘the sending
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or
its substantial involvement therein,’” would be an armed attack by the State
concerned, thereby permitting a forceful response against both that State and the
non-State actors.125
But whether Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international law
encompass an attack by non-State actors who lack the Nicaragua relationship to
a State remains unsettled. The better view, in light of the extensive post 9/11
State practice of responding to attacks by non-State groups such as Al Qaeda
and Daesh, and the absence of any limitation on the right of self-defense to
attacks launched by or attributable to States in the text of Article 51, is that it
does.126 However, on two occasions the ICJ has questioned application of the
124
125

Id.
Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195, citing art. 3, ¶ (g), of G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note

111.
126
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN
WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OF AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 2 (2011) [hereinafter White
Paper], http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/408/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. (for the US position on the
matter); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American
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right to non-State actor attacks in situations not meeting the Nicaragua
standard.127
In that Article 5 derives directly from Article 51 of the Charter, the same
question presents itself vis-à-vis the former. In this regard, it appears that the
Alliance has adopted the position that Article 5 extends to non-State actor
attacks.128 Although there are suggestions that the intent of the drafters might
have been to limit Article 5 to armed attacks by States, the only time the NAC
has invoked the provision was in response to an attack by a non-State actor, Al
Qaeda.129 Both of the ensuing Article 5 operations were intended to forestall
further attacks by the group or other transnational terrorists.130
That the Alliance perceives actions by non-State actors, especially terrorists,
as a direct threat is a point, as noted above, made in the current NATO strategic
doctrine and at the organization’s most recent summit.131 Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg has also emphasized the flexibility of Article 5. Speaking in
September 2018 at the 9/11 Memorial, the Secretary General noted that before
9/11, “the whole idea with Article 5 was to defend European Allies against [the]
Soviet Union sending the battle tanks over something called the Fulda gap in
Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010); David Kaye,
International Law Issues in the Department of Justice White Paper on Targeted Killing, 17 ASIL INSIGHTS 8,
n.1 (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/8/international-lawissues-department-justicewhite-paper-targeted-killing#_edn1 (for substantiation of the White Paper); Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Law: A
Reply to U.N. Special Rapporteur Emmerson, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. DIGEST 13, 16–17 (2014)(on the author’s views);
Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, 32 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM.
RTS 53–116 (2002) [hereinafter Counter-terrorism] (on the author’s views).
127
Armed Activities on Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 143,
146–47 (Dec. 19, 2019); Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 65, 139, 150 (July 9). Both decisions were controversial, even among
members of the Court. See, e.g., Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 337, ¶ 11 (separate opinion of Judge Simma); Wall, 2004
I.C.J. at 215, ¶ 33 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. at 229–30, ¶ 35 (separate opinion of Judge
Kooijmans); id. at 242–43, ¶ 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
128
In the 1999 Strategic Concept, terrorism had already been identified as a threat to the Alliance. New
Strategic Concept, supra note 97.
129
Heindel, supra note 67, at 645 (“Since the principal objective of the Treaty is to safeguard the security
of the North Atlantic area, only such armed attacks as threaten that security are contemplated. This rules out
violence of irresponsible groups and refers, as Article 51 of the Charter clearly contemplates, to an armed attack
of one state against another.”); Note that the Organization of American States and ANZUS also invoked the
collective defense provision of their treaties, thereby confirming their view that self-defense extended to nonState actors’ armed attacks. See Government Invokes ANZUS, supra note 82.
130
See The Article 5 NATO Medal (Operation Eagle Assist), AIR FORCE PERSONNEL CENTER (July 27,
2016), https://www.afpc.af.mil/About/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/873203/the-article-5-nato-medal-operationeagle-assist/; Operation Active Endeavour, supra note 86.
131
See Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supra note 98; Brussels Summit, supra note 15, ¶¶ 21, 28.
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Germany.”132 According to the Secretary-General, 9/11 taught the Alliance to
be prepared for the unexpected.133 In that regard, he cited a “more assertive
Russia,” terrorism and cyber, although he cautioned that the emphasis should be
“less on trying to predict” and “more on how to be able to react to deal with and
manage, if and when surprises happen.”134 It is clear that he does not consider
the application of Article 5 to either be limited to attacks launched by States or
to particular genre of attacks.
Beyond the material scope of the right of self-defense lies temporal
uncertainty. The question is whether Article 5 may be invoked anticipatorily,
that is, may self or collective defense justify the taking of forceful measures
before the armed attack is launched? This is a long-standing point of contention
in international law, for the text of Article 51 appears to address only armed
attacks that are underway.135
Most States and contemporary international law scholars are of the view that
Article 51 must necessarily be understood as allowing for anticipatory action.136
After all, it would be foolhardy for States to believe themselves obliged to “take
the first hit” or required to rely solely upon the Security Council to deal with
imminent threats of armed attack. The challenge is identifying when a State’s
anticipatory right matures.137
The traditional approach is to consider the issue in terms of temporal
proximity. Advocates look to the famous 19th-century exchange of diplomatic
notes between the United States and Great Britain over the Caroline incident.138
There, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster suggested that defensive uses of

132
Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at
the National September 11 Memorial & Museum, New York (Sept. 26, 2018) in Remarks by NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg at the National September 11 Memorial & Museum, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG.
(2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_158298.htm.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
See Nolte & Randelzhofer, supra note 30, ¶¶ 49–50.
136
Id.
137
See, e.g. Jeremy Wright, Attorney General, Modern Law of Self-Defence, The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, London (Jan. 11, 2017); Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual
Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 770 (2012).
138
See Nolte & Randelzhofer, supra note 30, ¶¶ 49–50.
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force are permissible when there is “a necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”139
This approach was suitable during a period in which an adversary’s
aggressive intent and its steps preparatory to an attack were often visible.
Examples include the movement of troops to the border, activation of reserve
forces, and aircraft “stand down” to permit maintenance and uploading of
munitions. Indeed, during the Cold War, NATO regularly monitored Soviet and
other Warsaw Pact forces for such “indications and warnings” of attack.
Although they might not give the NAC a great deal of warning, there was a
general sense that an attack would not manifest as a total “bolt out of the blue.”
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President George Bush issued his 2002
US National Security Strategy.140 Despite sparking a major controversy over the
notions of “preemptive” and “preventive” defense, the strategy perceptively
identified two significant changes in the nature of the 21st Century threats many
States face.141 The first is that, as tragically illustrated on September 11, an
armed attack is likely to occur with no warning. Indeed, attacking without
warning is the objective of terrorist operations, for advance notice would usually
allow the victim State to foil the attack. Second, President Bush noted that in
light of growing access to weapons of mass destruction, the first blow in an
armed attack could be catastrophic.142 These accurate observations have
underpinned reconsideration of the temporal approach. An alternative approach
that has gained traction is to treat the right of anticipatory self-defense as having
matured upon the occurrence of three conditions.143 First, the prospective
attacker either must have the capability to conduct the attack in question or the
acquisition of such capability must be imminent.144 Second, the attacker must
have formed a definitive intent to mount the armed attack.145 Finally, the State
resorting to self-defense may only act during the “last window of opportunity,”

139
Correspondence between Great Britain and The United States, Respecting the Arrest and Imprisonment
of Mr. McLeod, for the Destruction of the Steamboat Caroline, Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, 29 BSP
1129, 1137–38 (1857).
140
White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002) [hereinafter
National Security Strategy].
141
See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies and International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L.
513 (2003) [hereinafter Preemptive Strategies].
142
See National Security Strategy, supra note 140, at 15.
143
Counter-Terrorism, supra note 126, at 65 (the author first proposed the interpretation in 2002); see also
Preemptive Strategies, supra note 141, at 534–35.
144
Counter-Terrorism, supra note 126, at 65; see also Preemptive Strategies, supra note 141, at 534–35.
145
Id.
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that is, at the point when the failure to act defensively would effectively deprive
that State of its ability to prevent the forthcoming armed attack.146 The
paradigmatic example is that of a terrorist group intent on conducting attacks
against a State. If the State locates the leadership of the group and reasonably
concludes that it may not have another opportunity to strike those leaders or
otherwise foil the attack before it unfolds, the State may act even though the
precise moment and location of the terrorist attack is unknown.
Although the United States has now been adopted this approach to
anticipatory self-defense,147 most other States have not taken a position on the
matter. Therefore, it likely would prove contentious if presented to the NAC for
action. At least in the immediate future, therefore, it is doubtful that the NAC
would invoke Article 5 in such circumstances.
Complicating matters is a degree of uncertainty regarding whether Article 5
itself allows for anticipatory self-defense. Sylvain Fournier and Lewis
Bumgardner have perceptively noted, for instance, that the provision does not
include the word “inherent” that is found in Article 51 of the Charter.148 They
query whether this signals that Article 5 was intended to be limited to situations
fitting squarely within the textual four corners of Articles 5 and 51, even if
anticipatory self-defense was permissible under customary—inherent—
international law when the North Atlantic Treaty was drafted.149
Although such an interpretation is colorable, the better position is that no
distinction can be read into Article 5 between the inherent customary right of
self-defense and the separate treaty-based right reflected in Article 51, to which
Article 5 refers. It must be recalled that two Allies, Italy and Portugal, were not
members of the United Nations in 1949—both joined in 1955.150 If the absence
of reference to the “inherent right” in Article 5 had been meant to limit the
provision’s application to those armed attacks encompassed in Article 51 as read
without the term “inherent,” those two Alliance members, as non-Parties to the

146

Id.
White Paper, supra note 126, at 7. Other countries have embraced the last window of opportunity
standard. See George Brandis, Australian Attorney-General, The Right of Self-Defence Against Imminent
Armed Attack in International Law, University of Queensland (Apr. 11, 2017), in The Right of Self-Defence
Against Imminent Armed Attack in International Law, EJIL: TALK! (2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-rightof-self-defence-against-imminent-armed-attack-in-international-law/; Jeremy Wright, supra note 137.
148
Fournier & Bumgardner, supra note 77, at 26.
149
Id.
150
See Member states, UNITED N ATIONS , https://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html
147
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U.N. Charter—with its reference to the inherent right—would have fallen
outside Article 5’s protective scope altogether.
This cannot have been the drafters’ intent; therefore, it seems clear that the
Article 5 reference to Article 51 necessarily was meant to encompass defensive
rights, including anticipatory self and collective defense, under both Article 51
and customary law. In support of this conclusion, note that the International
Court of Justice observed in its Nicaragua judgment that the inherent right does
not differ materially from its treaty-based analogue.151 Indeed, the mainstream
view in international law remains that both Article 51 and customary
international law admit of a right of anticipatory self-defense. For example, this
was the position taken by the U.N. High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change in 2004.152 Accordingly, Article 5 can best be characterized as having
included, and still including, a right of anticipatory self and collective defense.
NAC authorization of operations on the basis of anticipatory collective defense
might be fraught with political obstacles, but the legal basis for doing so resides
comfortably within the North Atlantic Treaty.
3. Geographical Scope
The text of Article 5 sets forth its casus foederis—the event that activates
the duty to render assistance—an armed attack launched against a member of
the Alliance “in Europe or North America.”153 Article 6 expounds on the
geographical scope:
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the
Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
 on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America,
on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of
Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the
Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
 on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or
over these territories or any other area in Europe in which
occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date

151

Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 176.
U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
153
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
152
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when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or
the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.154

It is important to note that the qualifying armed attack may be on forces
based outside their own State’s territory so long as they are located in the area
set forth in Article 6, as in the case of the U.S. forces stationed in Europe.155
The Alliance has adjusted the geographical scope set forth in Article 6 on
multiple occasions. In 1951, the text referring to Turkey was added by means of
a Protocol in response to the accession of Greece and Turkey.156 At the same
time, the original 1949 text dealing with occupation forces was slightly modified
to clarify Article 5’s application to forces in occupied Germany.157 The
modification was a reaction to the 1948 Berlin Blockade and the subsequent
increase in tension with the Soviet Union and its satellites.158
A dozen years later, the NAC declared that the reference to the Algerian
Departments of France was inapplicable as of July 3, 1962, the date France
recognized Algerian independence.159 During the drafting of the North Atlantic
Treaty, the United States and Canada objected to a collective defense
commitment that extended to the colonies of Alliance members out of concern
that NATO might be used to maintain the European colonial relationships.160
However, at the time Algeria was officially a department of France; hence its
inclusion in the original scope of the instrument.161
While Article 6 sets out the geographical scope of the armed attack that can
trigger the NAC’s right to invoke Article 5, it does not limit that of NATO
Article 5 operations or those mounted on any other basis. The difference is
subtle but important. For example, an armed attack against U.S. forces in Asia
would not trigger Article 5, but an attack from Asia into the United States would
154

Id. art. 6.
See id.
156
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, art. 2, Oct. 17, 1951, 3
U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S. 350.
157
See id. The original text of Article 6 read “on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe.” The
Original North Atlantic Treaty, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., art. 6 (1949), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_
fl2014/assets/pdf/history_pdf/20161122_E1-founding-treaty-original-treaty_NN-en.pdf. Note that the revised
text focuses on the territory concerned, not the forces themselves. See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art.
5.
158
See Fournier & Bumgardner, supra note 77, at 13–14.
159
Summary Record, North Atlantic Council, Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe, Jan. 16, 1963, at
sect. V, https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/C-R(63)2.PDF.
160
See Fournier & Bumgardner, supra note 77, at 10–11.
161
Id. at 13–14.
155
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do so. Should the latter situation occur, NATO forces would not be precluded
from engaging the attacker outside the Euro-Atlantic space on the basis of
collective defense.
The Alliance itself has observed that this was the case from the beginning,
while contemporary NATO summit declarations have confirmed the
interpretation on multiple occasions. 162 As an example, the 2002 Reykjavik
Summit Communiqué noted, “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO
must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed,
sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”163
Similarly, the NATO Heads of State agreed at the 2018 Brussels Summit that
“We are committed to strengthening our ability to deploy and sustain our forces
and their equipment, throughout the Alliance and beyond….”164
It should be cautioned that the Article 6 geographical limitations apply only
to Article 5 operations. Since 1999, other NATO operations, known as “NonArticle 5 Crisis Response Operations” (NA5CRO), have been common.165 These
have ranged from providing assistance to the United States following Hurricane
Katrina to engaging in combat in Libya and Afghanistan.166 The legal basis for
such operations, including those in which force is employed, is on firm footing
when mandated or authorized by a U.N. Security Council resolution under
Chapter VII of the Charter, as was the case with respect to operations in Libya
and Afghanistan.167 By contrast, the legality of Operation Allied Force, the 1999
NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in

162
See Collective Defence–Article 5, supra note 89. “According to one of the drafters of the Treaty,
Theodore C. Achilles, there was no doubt in anybody’s mind that NATO operations could also be conducted
south of the Tropic of Cancer.” Nato Public Diplomacy Division, NATO A–Z PAGES, https://www.nato.int/nato_
static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20150316_2014_AZ_pages.pdf.
163
Final Communiqué, May 14, 2002, ¶ 5.
164
Brussels Summit, supra note 15, ¶ 17.
165
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., ¶ 24. (Apr. 10, 1999),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.
166
Petra Ochmannova, NATO: Evolution and Legal Framework for the Conduct of Operations, 34 NATO
LEGAL GAZETTE 31, 33–34 (2014).
167
S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001) (the original resolution establishing the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan); S.C. Res. 1973 (March 17, 2011) (the resolution that authorized NATO’s
Operation Unified Protector).
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response to gross human rights abuses in Kosovo, was of uncertain legality, for
it was mounted without the Council having adopted such a resolution.168
4. The Requisite Agreement
A decision to invoke Article 5 is taken by the NAC, which consists of
Permanent Representatives of all the Allies, but that also sometimes meets at the
Foreign Minister, Defense Minister or Head of State or Government level.169
The NAC’s decision-making authority does not depend upon the level at which
it meets and its decisions are taken by consensus pursuant to a “silence
procedure” in which there is no vote on a proposal, but a single objection “breaks
the silence” and therefore blocks the decision.170 In such a decision-making
system, individual members exercise exceptional power with respect to the
invocation of Article 5, for a single Ally may block NATO from taking action
in the face of an unambiguous, even devastating, armed attack on a member of
the Alliance. As noted, such discretion was the cost of securing U.S.
Congressional support for the North Atlantic Treaty after being drawn into two
world wars in Europe in less than half a century.171
This risk that an Ally might exercise its authority to block Article 5 action
has grown measurably since 1949. Originally, the States that comprised the
Alliance were relatively homogenous and faced a single shared existential threat
from the Soviet Union and its satellites.172 Today, the group is geographically,
culturally, religiously and politically diverse, having expanded over the years
into the Mediterranean region, the Balkans and Eastern Europe.173 Of course, the
more diverse the Alliance in terms of perspective and national interests, the more
difficult it will be to achieve consensus on what is the most significant decision
a State can take in international relations—the decision to resort to armed force.
Failure of the NAC to achieve consensus regarding whether to invoke Article
5 would not bar the Alliance’s members from defending themselves in

168

See, e.g. Bruno Simma, NATO, the U.N. and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1

(1999).
169

North Atlantic Treaty supra note 1, art. 9 (Article 9 establishes the Council).
Ochmannova, supra note 166, at 35.
171
See generally, Aurel Sari, The Mutual Assistance Clauses of the North Atlantic and EU Treaties: The
Challenge of Hybrid Threats (forthcoming HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 2019) (analyzing the issue).
172
A Short History of NATO, supra note 4.
173
See Member Countries, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/nato_countries.htm.
170
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individual self-defense.174 Nor would it preclude other Allies from coming to its
defense outside the North Atlantic Treaty framework pursuant to Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter and customary international law.175
But a decision by the NAC that an armed attack has occurred would not
release a State from its individual obligation under Article 51 of the Charter to
only engage in collective defense if an armed attack is on-going or imminent
and the use of force to defend against that attack is both necessary and
proportionate.176 This is because U.N. Charter obligations enjoy primacy over
those contained in the other treaties, including the North Atlantic Treaty.177
Further support for this premise is found in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, which provides that “[w]hen a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or
that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the
provisions of that other treaty prevail.”178 In the case of the North Atlantic
Treaty, this principle appears in Article 7’s confirmation that the provisions of
the instrument do not affect the U.N. Charter rights and obligations of its
Parties.179 At least in theory, therefore, a State employing force pursuant to a
NAC collective defense decision could be acting unlawfully if the invocation of
Article 5 was without basis in international law.
5. Scope of the Commitment
Article 5 requires that Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty consider an attack
against one or more of them to be an attack upon them all and assist the victim(s)
either by providing assistance directly or in collaboration with other States.180
However, it caveats this obligation with the phrase “such action as it deems
necessary.”181 This is a rather complicated formulation, as the “will assist” text

174

See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 51.
176
Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 176, 194; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8); Oil Platforms, supra note 117, ¶ 43, 73–74, 76; Judgment
of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (Sept. 30, 1946), in 22 The Trial of German
Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 435
(1950).
177
U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 103. Interestingly, the Warsaw Pact Treaty also provided for U.N.
Charter compliance (the instrument was markedly similar to the North Atlantic Treaty). Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, arts. 1, 4, Oct. 10, 1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 3.
178
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
179
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7
180
See id. art. 5.
181
Heindel, supra note 67, at 636 (the phrase was added to Article 5 following consultation with U.S.
Senators).
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in the Article 5 is expressed as an obligation, while the decision of how to assist
is textually left to individual Allies. The distinction begs the question of whether
an Alliance member may agree that an armed attack has occurred and
subsequently decide it is not necessary to provide any assistance or that only
assistance falling short of that considered necessary by the other Allies is
needed.
Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that the provisions of the
instrument are to be “carried out by the Parties in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.”182 Thus, even if a State has not blocked
invocation of Article 5 in the NAC, the decision on committing forces and, if so,
how to do so, may be subject to domestic law processes and authorities. In the
United States, limitations are found, for instance, in Article I of the Constitution,
which grants Congress the power of the purse and the rights to declare war, raise
armies and maintain a navy, as well as in legislation like the War Powers Act,
and Authorization for the Use of Military Force.183 The precise parameters of
these limitations may be the subject of debate, but there is no question that
Congress could act, in part, to limit the scope and degree of U.S. collective
defense measures in response to the NAC’s Article 5 invocation.184
U.S. reticence to be irreversibly bound to the defense of other countries was
not unique to the North Atlantic Treaty. For example, Article V of the Japan–
U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security provides that “Each Party
recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the
administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes.”185 The provision recognizes that to the
extent the U.S. Constitution requires the involvement of Congress in an
authorization to use military force, that process must be followed irrespective of

182
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11. The reference was originally located in the preamble, but
during negotiations moved to Article 11 at the suggestion of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
emphasize the importance of compliance with the constitutional processes of the respective member States;
Heindel, supra note 67, at 636.
183
U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 8–9; War Powers Act, 50 U.S.C., §§ 1541-48 (1976); Authorization for Use of
Military Force, 115 Stat. 224, 224.
184
See, e.g. Matthew Waxman, Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutional War Powers, 123 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 297 (2013); Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 115 (2014).
185
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (U.S.-Japan), art. V, June 19, 1960, 11 UST 1632, TIAS
4509, 373 U.N.T.S. 186.
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the collective defense commitment set forth in the instrument. A similar
provision is found in Article III of the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.186
Such discretion has led to disagreement over the nature of Article 5 and
similar commitments. In response to Michael Glennon’s claim that these
arrangement represent an “element of non-committal in the commitment,” Aurel
Sari asserted, “a legal commitment to act nonetheless exists.”187 Perhaps the best
view is that a State acting in good faith pursuant to the principle pacta sunt
servanda, as is required by the law of treaties, must not block invocation of
Article 5 when an armed attack unambiguously occurs against a member of the
Alliance.188
Following invocation, each Ally similarly must act in good faith in seeking
to fulfill its collective defense obligation under Article 5 by providing necessary
support. This was the sense of Senate Foreign Relations Committee when
considering the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949: “These words were included in
article 5 to make absolutely clear that each party remains free to exercise its
honest judgment in deciding upon the measures it will take to help restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”189 However, should
constitutional or other domestic law obstacles stand in the way of it doing so, an
Ally will not be in breach of Article 5 should it fail to offer assistance.
6. Other Collective Defense Requirements
In light of the fact that action pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty is an expression of U.N. Charter Article 51, any action taken pursuant to
the latter is subject to the full panoply of limitations and requirements thereon.
For instance, it is widely accepted that a condition precedent to exercise of
collective defense under customary law and Article 51 is a request for assistance
by the State facing the armed attack.190 As noted by the International Court of
Justice in its Nicaragua judgment, “It is also clear that it is the State which is the
victim of an armed attack which must form and declare the view that it has been
so attacked. There is no rule in customary international law permitting another
State to exercise the right of collective self-defense on the basis of its own

186

Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S.-Korea), art. III, Oct. 1, 1953, 5 UST 2368; TIAS 3097; 238 U.N.T.S.

199.
187
188
189
190

Michael J. Glennon, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 214 (1990); Sari, supra note 171 at 149.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 178, art. 26.
SENATE EXEC. REP. NO. 8, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, at 13–14.
See Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195.; U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 51.
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assessment of the situation.”191 In light of the NAC decision-making system,
should the possibility of invoking Article 5 arise in other than a request by the
victim State—an unlikely scenario—the presence of the victim State at the NAC
session considering the matter, and its decision not to object in order to block
action, could reasonably be interpreted as such a request.
Before invoking Article 5, the criterion of necessity must be satisfied, and
any action taken has to be proportionate.192 Necessity requires that non-forceful
measures be insufficient to address the ongoing armed attack or prevent one that
is imminent, whereas proportionality limits the scale and scope of defensive
force employed to that required to meet or prevent the attack.193 The
International Court of Justice set forth these twin criteria in the Nicaragua, Oil
Platforms and Armed Activities judgments, as well as the Nuclear Weapons
advisory opinion.194 Importantly, the NAC’s invocation of Article 5 does not
release individual members of the Alliance that are acting in collective defense
from independently assessing necessity and proportionality or relieve them of
any responsibility for having wrongfully used force in violation of Article 2(4)
and customary international law in the event the criteria were not satisfied.195
Article 5 only authorizes collective defense in order “to restore or maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area.”196 The “restore and maintain . . .
security” text is drawn from the U.N. Charter.197 Indeed, maintenance of
international peace and security is the first of the purposes set forth for the
United Nations in Article 1 of that instrument.198 Additionally, the Charter limits
actions authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII, such as the use of
force in the face of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
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See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
193
Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 194; Oil Platforms, supra note 117, ¶¶¶ 43, 51, 73–77; Armed
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See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 5, 2(4).
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Id., art. 5.
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U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
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Id. art. 42 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate
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198
U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 1(1).
192

SCHMITTPROOFS2_10.24.19

2019]

10/28/2019 2:20 PM

NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AT 70

117

aggression,” to those necessary to “maintain or restore international peace and
security.”199
Yet the U.N. Charter imposes no requirement that action in individual or
collective self-defense serve to restore peace and security that has been breached
or maintain it in situations where they are at risk.200 For instance, a State is
entitled to defend itself, and other States are entitled to come to its defense, even
if defensive action is likely to be destabilizing for the international community,
perhaps by broadening a conflict, than surrender to an aggressor. By the text of
Article 5, however, NATO is not entitled to resort to defensive force in support
of an Ally unless doing so would contribute to the restoration and maintenance
of security in the region.201 Theoretically, this would bar defensive action
necessary to defend an Ally if it would be escalatory or otherwise destabilizing
in the circumstances at hand.
For instance, a robust NATO response to a low-level armed attack on one of
the Baltic States arguably could be seen as broadly destabilizing in the EastWest context. Fears of such a strict textual reading of Article 5 barring a response
would be misplaced. First, to comply with the proportionality criterion of
collective defense, any NATO action would have to be limited to the force
required to repel the armed attack, thereby tempering the risk of destabilization
or escalation. Second, even if a State were to rely upon this highly legalistic
interpretation to justify an objection to Article 5’s invocation, all other Allies
would remain permitted to individually, or in concert with other States, come to
the collective defense of the victim State outside the NATO command
structure.202 And a failure to respond forcefully to any armed aggression against
an Alliance member would itself be destabilizing in that it would encourage
further aggression. This was, after all, one of the key lessons of World War II.
Finally, Article 5 requires that any action taken be immediately reported to
the Security Council, as was done in the one case in which the provision was
invoked by the NAC.203 The requirement to notify is drawn directly from the
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See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
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text of U.N. Charter Article 51. Accordingly, its presence in Article 5 mandates
no heavier burden than already shouldered pursuant to that article.204
In the case of the 9/11 attacks, the notification came in a letter from NATO
Secretary-General Lord Robertson passed to the Security Council through the
U.N. Secretary-General. It provided, in part,
Article 5 has thus been invoked, but no determination has yet been
made whether the attack against the United States was directed from
abroad. If such a determination is made, each Ally will then consider
what assistance it should provide. In practice, there will be
consultations among the Allies. Any collective action by NATO will
be decided by the North Atlantic Council. The United States can also
carry out independent actions, consistent with its rights and obligations
under the U.N. Charter.
Allies can provide any form of assistance they deem necessary to
respond to the situation. This assistance is not necessarily military and
depends on the material resources of each country. Each individual
member determines how it will contribute and will consult with the
other members, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to “to restore
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
…
If the conditions are met for the application of Article 5, NATO Allies
will decide how to assist the United States. (Many Allies have clearly
offered emergency assistance). Each Ally is obliged to assist the
United States by taking forward, individually and in concert with other
Allies, such action as it deems necessary. This is an individual
obligation on each Ally and each Ally is responsible for determining
what it deems necessary in these particular circumstances.
No collective action will be taken by NATO until further consultations
are held and further decisions are made by the North Atlantic
Council.205

Reflecting the key points made earlier, the Alliance insisted on confirming
that the incident to which it was responding was an armed attack mounted from
outside the United States. It did so because NATO is not entitled to act in
collective defense against domestic terrorism. As noted above, the requisite
confirmation of the attack emanating from abroad was provided the NAC on
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See What is Article 5?, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.nato.int/
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October 2. The Secretary-General’s notification also pointed out that all the
members of the Alliance bore the obligation of assisting the United States,
although each State was entitled to determine for itself the assistance that was
necessary.206 Lastly, although collective action required the approval of the
NAC, the notification acknowledged that the United States remained free to
exercise its right of individual self-defense irrespective of NAC action—or
inaction. Although not expressly contained in the notification, this would
necessary include requesting assistance in collective defense from individual
members of the Alliance or non-NATO States—outside the NATO framework.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
President Donald Trump has at times questioned U.S. participation in
NATO.207 Such short-sighted musing is highly destabilizing, for the collective
defense commitment resident in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is today
no less a confession that the U.N. Security Council cannot ensure the security of
Europe, Canada, and the United States than was the case seven decades ago. And
the article continues to play a role as a response to Russia’s insidious actions in
that region, as well as that of other actors, especially transnational terrorist
groups.
However, understanding the scope and content of Article 5 has proven
increasingly challenging over the past seventy years as the regional and global
security environment became ever more complex and multifaceted. At its
inception, Article 5 was most likely to operate in an environment in which war
clouds would appear on the horizon well in advance of an armed attack and in
which conflict would occur conventionally across geopolitical borders. That is
no longer the case. The attack to which Article 5 action responds may come
without warning; the first blow could be cataclysmic; non-State actors may
attack without the involvement of any State; an attack could involve weapons of
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mass destruction; the conflict might commence, or even remain entirely within,
a virtual domain; and the decision-making structure of the Alliance requires
consensus among more than double the original number of Allies, and that group
of States has become far more diverse. Such transformations have rendered a
common legal understanding of the parameters and content of Article 5 ever
more elusive; they do not inspire sanguinity.
Nevertheless, optimism may be drawn from the fact that Article 5 has served
as an effective, albeit imperfect, deterrent against aggression in the region, one
that likewise has had a counter-escalatory effect. So long as the Allies, especially
the United States, do not undercut the credibility of the collective defense
commitment represented by the provision, Article 5 is likely to serve the same
purposes very effectively well into the foreseeable future.

